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Sweet Self-deception
JEL classication: A12, B49, C70, D11, D60, D74, D91, E21
Abstract
People have a tendency to procrastinate when faced with aversive tasks - but they
also procrastinate in relation to benecial matters whose rewards are instantaneous.
If agents value present anticipations of future consumption, revision of consumption
plans may be viewed as a benign form of self-deception. We consider a minimal
generalization of the Samuelson discounted utility model to allow for utility linked
to next period consumption. Agents are assumed to vary with respect to their
sophistication. In this context, commitment and self-control are obstacles to the
pursuit of increased utility. We also examine dierent environments that are likely
to facilitate repeated revisions.
Key words: Intertemporal choice; self-deception; time inconsistency; naivete;
self-control; discounted utility functions; anticipation; memory
1 Introduction
We all make plans. Plans involve actions of our future selves. Putting o vac-
uuming the house may please today's you, but may not go down too well
with the you of tomorrow. Indeed, come tomorrow, you might well nd your-
self looking for an excuse to postpone the chore, letting some future you take
responsibility. But as we all know, procrastination, even over seemingly me-
nial tasks, can snowball into signicant welfare losses. 1 This paper reverses
this proposition, however. What if your failure to commit to yesterday's plan
actually produces higher utility? If plans for future consumption oset antic-
ipations of present value, revising a plan may increase utility all told. You
may in fact nd it better to consume less today than you had planned or
anticipated yesterday. In this scenario, the well-known self-control problem of
procrastination becomes one of self-deception. And the question is not how to
improve your self-commitment record, but to nd an environment which helps
you revise your plans.
Now self-deception could be said to be a contradiction in terms. It seems to rely
on a logical inconsistency, knowing and not knowing at the same time. And
self-deception can be extremely harmful in a competitive environment. Trivers
(2011) takes an opposite view. Self-deception, he contends, is widespread in
the animal kingdom and there is an evolutionary push toward self deception.
The main explanation for self-deception, he adds, is that you fool yourself for
better to fool others. There is, moreover, an immunological upside of an overly
positive self-evaluation. True or not, neither explanation has any immediate
bearing on economic theory. What we want to do in this paper is to show
that benecial self-deception occur in one-agent intertemporal consumption
scenarios. In other words, self-deception for your own good is not limited to
the animal kingdom; we need to add homo economicus to the list as well.
1 See O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for a discussion and extensive literature review.
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The following example provides the intuition. Sheila plans to make a cake last
three days. On the rst day she cuts it into three pieces of dierent sizes. While
eating the rst day's ration, she savors the thought of tomorrow's helping, the
larger of the two remaining two slices. But when tomorrow comes, Sheila
discovers that she'd prefer to save the biggest piece for the nal day because
she'll have an extra day to mull over the enticing prospect of the big slice to
come.
It is important to note the conict of interest between the Sheila of Day 1
and the Day 2 counterpart. For Day 1-Sheila, her commitment to her plan is
arguably essential for the utilities she enjoys on the rst day. However, Day 2-
Sheila's commitment to yesterday's plan is less evident. After all, Sheila may
argue, yesterday is history, and so is Day 1-Sheila. What concerns her now
is getting as much utility as possible from the two remaining slices of cake.
She could save the biggest slice for third and nal day, of course. But then
again, her second day self may begin to waver in her commitment to the plan,
or feel remorse for deviating from it. This may or may not be sucient to
induce Sheila to proceed as planned. The key observation is that whatever
Day 2-Sheila does, Day 1-Sheila is not worse o.
In short, there is a potential upside of non-commitment in this intertemporal
consumption problem. But that immediately raises the question of why the
rst day Sheila can believe that she will consume the biggest piece the following
day, when it is better for the second day Sheila to deviate. There must be some
kind of self-deception at work. This is where we are heading.
Our starting point is the much used Samuelson's discounted utility model
(Samuelson 1937). As this is a discounted sum of instantaneous utility func-
tions, it involves a premise of total amnesia, as if we were to plan a sequence
of sensations of no value to us except in the heat of the moment. In medical
parlance, the economic agent invoked by Samuelson's DU model is suering
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from Korsako's syndrome. 2 The paper generalizes Samuelson's DU model
to allow for utility from memories and anticipations. Two types of agents are
considered. The rst has preferences as implied by the standard Samuelson
utility model (0-korsakos); the other a rudimentary memory (1-korsakos).
A 1-korsako remembers a consumption plan the time period it is made, and
may harbor (positive) anticipations regarding the next period's consumption.
But she has no recollection of past consumption or yesterday's plan. A 1-
korsako can be viewed as the rst step towards an agent with full recollection.
This rudimentary memory aects intertemporal choice. 1-korsakos tend to
be time-inconsistent, and repeated revisions may cut a path to higher long-run
utility.
This paper connects with the literature on self-deception and self-control. Gul
and Pesendorfer's (2001) seminal contribution shifted attention of inconsisten-
cies of intertemporal choice away from preferences over consumption bundles,
to preferences over a class of decision problems. Their axiomatic treatment of
preferences allows for "Set Betweenness," i.e. a preference for limiting future
choices. This provides fertile ground for studying temptations and the cost
of self-control. Noor (2007) found the implications of future temptations to
be mixed. Agents who are aware of their self-control problems may not take
advantage of commitment opportunities. The possibility of indulging tempta-
tion in the future is itself a source of temptation. Kopylov and Noor (2010)
consider self-deception in a fairly explicit form, because their model allows
for the agent to rationalize actions that eventually will lead to temptation.
Arguing along a similar vein, Sarver's(2008) agents seeks to reduce potential
regret. Halevy (2008) studies diminishing impatience and argues that posi-
tive time preference is deeply connected to uncertainty. Fudenberg and Levine
2 Korsako's syndrome: Neurological disorder marked by severe amnesia despite clear perception and full
consciousness, resulting from chronic alcoholism, head injury, brain illness, or thiamin deciency. Aected
persons typically fail to remember events in the recent or even immediate past; some retain memories for only
a few seconds. Suerers are also likely to forget longer periods {up to 20 years. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
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(2012) show also that timing is essential when it comes to understanding the
cost of self-control. An agent may resist a one shot temptation, but give in to
temptation if it is permanent or extends over a number of time periods.
The economic agents that we shall be considering bear a closer resemblance to
those modeled by Loewenstein(1987), Caplin and Leahy (2001), Bernheim and
Thomadsen (2005), Epstein (2008) and K}oszegi (2010), inasmuch as anticipa-
tory feelings aect intertemporal choice. The model presented here contrasts
with this literature, as commitment and self-control may stand in the way of
utility-increasing revisions of consumption plans. The self-deception consid-
ered here relies on the agent not fully understanding her future preferences
and actions, and partly resembles in structure potential information aversion
as considered by Epstein(2008). Moreover, our results also dier from the game
theory approach of Asheim (1997). He introduces revision-proof strategies as
a renement of subgame-perfectness. If an agent becomes aware of her self-
control problems, she can limit her decision problem by only considering plans
she will actually follow. In our model, self-deceiving behavior is conditional on
non-revision-proof consumption plans.
This paper's contribution to the study of self-deception and intertemporal
choice is threefold. First, it extends the Samuelson DU model so as to facil-
itate a comparison of agents with diering mnemonic capacities. Second, it
considers a simple, but critical distinction where anticipation of consumption
is connected to plans of consumption, not future consumption per se. Third,
it adds to the potential downside of commitment and self-control.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we dene k-korsako prefer-
ences in a T-period consumption scenario of one continuous good. Section 3
considers consumption of one indivisible good that is to be consumed over
a given number of time periods. The discussion draws heavily on the agent
types, nafs and sophisticates, introduced by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
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Whereas naivete tends to yield poor long-run outcomes, the results presented
here extend the potential downside of sophistication. Sophisticates have less
opportunity to revise repeatedly, and as a result may to get lower long-run
utility in comparison with nafs. In section 4 we discuss a model, the life span
uncertainty model, which provides an example of benign self-deception among
sophisticates. The model is an abstraction of the following scenario. Upon re-
tirement we decide to spend a year in Rio. But which year? While we know
we will not live forever, we do not know how many years we have left. As
time passes and our general health deteriorates, we want to go before it is too
late. In a stylized version of this consumption problem, we show that sophis-
ticates can achieve the same long-run utility as nafs. In other words, a little
uncertainty regarding the number of time periods facilitates utility increasing
revisions even for sophisticates. Section 5 concludes.
2 The DU model with memory and anticipation
In this section we extend Samuelson's discounted utility model by including
utility of memories of past consumption and anticipations of planned con-
sumption.
Denition 2.1 Any consumption vector (c1; : : : ; cT ) give rise to a vector of
memories (0;m2; : : : ;mT ), where mi is a function of past consumption, that
is mi = mi(c<i), where c<i = (c1; : : : ; ci 1) for all i > 1.
Anticipation utility is linked to expected consumption, thus in the context of
intertemporal choice, plans of future consumption. We can formalize anticipa-
tions like this:
Denition 2.2 Any consumption plan represented by a planned consumption
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vector (c1;plan; : : : ; cT;plan)
3 give rise to a vector of anticipations (a1; : : : ; aT )
where ai is a function of future planned consumption, that is ai = ai(c>i;plan)
where c>i;plan = (ci+1;plan; : : : ; cT;plan) for all i  1.
We can view the anticipations of Denition 2.2 as rst order anticipations,
i.e. anticipations about consumption. It could be argue that people also have
anticipations about memories (ai(mj)), memories of anticipations (mj(ai)) and
anticipations of anticipations (ai(aj)) et cetera. These we can view as second
or higher order memories and anticipations. Here, we consider only rst order
memories and anticipations.
A straightforward generalization of a Samuelson's DU model with anticipa-
tions and recollections is:
U =
TX
i=1
i 1u(ci;mi(c<i); ai(c>i;plan)): (2.1)
where u is interpreted as an instantaneous utility function depending on
present consumption, memories of past consumption, and anticipations re-
lated to future consumption.
The utility function ( 2.1) places no limitation on utility from anticipation or
recollection. In the following we dene preference types by the extent to which
they receive utility from memory and anticipation.
Let a person consider an T-period consumption scenario. We will assume that
the preferences of all agents can be represented by a DU utility function, but
may dier according to their (korsako) type. A k-korsako has a consumption
horizon of k periods into the future and a recollection of the last k periods
of consumption, including the present time period. This is formalized in the
3 The reason for the subscript 'plan' is to make the distinction between consumption and planned con-
sumption explicit.
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following denition:
Denition 2.3 An agent is k-korsako, k a nonnegative integer, if the fol-
lowing the following two conditions hold:
I. mi(c1; : : : ; ci 1) = mi(cmax(1;i k+1); : : : ; ci 1) if k; i > 1 and mi = 0 other-
wise.
II. ai(ci+1;plan; : : : ; cT;plan) = ai(ci+1;plan; : : : ; cmin(T;i+k);plan) if k  1 and ai = 0
otherwise.
A few comments are in order. A 0-korsako has ai = mi = 0, and is the
economic agent implied by the standard DU function(DU0). A 1-korsako has
an instantaneous utility function given by u = u(ci; 0; ai(ci+1)). It represents
the crudest sense of memory, remembering the consumption plan in the time
period in which it was made. In other words, if a 1-korsako plans on eating
one hamburger every day, she cherishes the thought of tomorrow's burger,
while eating today's. In the next step up, the 2-korsako remembers last peri-
ods consumption, enjoys this period's consumption and looks forward to the
planned consumption of two next time periods. In this paper we shall largely
be concerned with 0-korsakos and 1-korsakos. 4
Denition 2.4 (Discounted utility functions for k-korsakos) The intertem-
poral utility function of a k-korsako is given by
DUk =
TX
i=1
i 1u(ci;mi(cmax(1;i k 1); : : : ; ci 1); ai(ci+1;plan; : : : ; cmin(T;i+k+1);plan)
(2.2)
where  < 1 and u, mi and ai are continuously dierentiable unbounded func-
4 Example A.1 in the appendix is of a 3-korsako. Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) study economic
decision making with memory and anticipation. Their economic agents may forget their past actions, and
in this sense resemble our 1-korsakos.
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tions with positive rst order partial derivatives and negative second order
partial derivatives with respect to all arguments.
Denition 2.4 states that the time invariant utility function u satises stan-
dard assumption of nonsatiation and diminishing marginal utility of consump-
tion. 5 It also states that the same preference structure applies to consump-
tion, memories and anticipations. Note that a 1-korsako takes account of
(discounted) future anticipations, since the utility function u, is in all terms of
the discounted sum. To increase readability and limit notational complexity,
we suppress the subscript i in most cases, and write DUk = DUk(c;m; a).
We use the following denition of time-consistent preference:
Denition 2.5 Let cplan = (c1;plan; : : : ; cT;plan) and c
?
plan = (c
?
1;plan; : : : ; c
?
T;plan)
be two consumption vectors that agree up to time j, that is ci;plan = c
?
i;plan
for i  j. Consider a consider at a discounted utility function DUk, and let
DUk(i) = DUk(c;m(c); a(c)) and DU
?
k (i) = DUk(c
?;m(c?); a(c?)) denote the
utility of cplan and c
?
plan at time i respectively. A function, DUk, is said to a
represent time-consistent preference if DUk(i) > DU
?
k (i) for some i  j imply
DUk(i) > DU
?
k (i) for all i  j.
This denition is just a formalized way of saying the following. Imagine com-
paring two consumption plans, A and B, for a week starting Monday. They are
exactly the same until Thursday. You nd A better than B on Monday. If you
have time-consistent preferences, you will nd A better than B on Tuesday,
and Wednesday as well. Preferences that are not time-consistent are said to
be time-inconsistent.
The following theorem states that 1-korsakos are time-inconsistent.
5 Note that this utility function implies that all selves has the same utility function over the stream of
physical outcomes and expectations. In this respect the utility function considered here is connected to the
dynamic model of K}oszegi (2010).
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Theorem 2.1 An agent with DU1-preferences is time-inconsistent.
A proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix. The dynamic inconsistency
for a 1-korsako comes into play because she picks a plan that involves her
consuming more in the next period than she actually ends up consuming. 6
Compared to a 0-korsako, who is always time-consistent, a 1-korsako skews
consumption towards the future. 7 The time inconsistencies that arise for a
1-korsako are structurally similar to those implied by hyperbolic discounting.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2.4 An intertemporal utility function for a 1-korsako
Let u(ci; a(ci+1)) = c
1
2
i + a(ci+1) = c
1
2
i + kc
1
2
i+1, where k is a (positive) constant.
This gives the following n-period DU1-utility function:
DU1(cplan) =
Pn
i=1 
i 1u(ci; a(ci+1;plan)) = c
1
2
1;plan + ( + k)
Pn
i=2 
i 1c
1
2
i;plan
The last sum is (1 + k) times the DU1 at time two (provided) c1 = c1;plan in
period 1. This relation allows us to make two observations. In this easy case,
where utility from anticipation is proportional to utility from consumption,
the utility function is structurally equal to an intertemporal utility function
with hyperbolic discounting. Present-biased preferences tend to be modeled
by an intertemporal utility function of the following type: Ui(ui; : : : ; uT ) =
iui + 
Pn
=i+1 
u .
8 In our model ( + k) plays the role of . Present-
6 Loewenstein (1987) consider a formal model where a person's instantaneous utility function takes the form
u(c ; c+1; c+2; : : : ) where the partial derivatives with respect to c 0 is positive for all 
0 >  . Loewenstein
proposes the following functional form: u(c ; c+1; c+2; : : : ) = v(c ) + (v(c+1) + 2v(c ) + : : : ) for
some  < 1. DU anomalies may also occur in Loewenstein's model.
7 Loewenstein(1987) reports from a study of undergraduates. They were asked to state the 'most they
would pay now' for a kiss from their favorite movie star. They could receive the kiss immediately or later
(four possible delays). The students went for the 'three day delayed' kiss. A more recent study by Shu and
Gneezy (2010) includes experiments and eld studies showing procrastination of enjoyable experiences such
as visits to fashionable restaurants and going to the movies.
8 See O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001), for a discussion and an extensive literature review.
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biased preferences and potentially myopic behavior arise when  < 1. In con-
trast, since we assume k > 0 are 1-korsakos potentially future-biased, and
hyperopic. 9
A valuation of anticipation of next period consumption implies giving more
weight to future consumption, compared to absence of valued anticipation.
The eect of the discount factor goes the other way: less weight is put on
future consumption compared to present consumption. If k + 1 =  1, then
anticipation completely balances the eect of discounting for consumption in
time period 2, but k has no eect on the weight put on consumption in time
period 3 compared to consumption in time period 4.
From a welfare perspective, time-inconsistent behavior could have some serious
implications. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) show that welfare losses can be
associated both with procrastination as well as preproperation. An analysis of
long-run consequences requires some notion of long-run utility of consumption
which allows us to compare dierent paths of consumption either ex ante or ex
post. In the following analysis we rely on the same long-run utility denition
as O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Long-run utility from consumption is here
dened as the sum of utility in all time periods without discounting. This may
be viewed as an ex ante utility where all future and past selves are considered
equal and this utility is assigned to a time period 0. 10 This utility concept
captures the possibility of achieving higher long-run utility by having wrong
expectations of future behavior.
Example 2.5 Long-run utility for a 1-korsako
Assume that a 1-korsako has made a plan to eat a cake over a four day period.
Her preferences are given by the intertemporal utility function of Example
9 If we allow for negative anticipations, that is k < 0, then this 1-korsako model corresponds to a standard
hyperbolic DU model with  =  + k (k >  )xxxxtenkigjennom dette med retting.
10 See Goldman (1979) for a brief discussion of dierent approaches regarding long-run utility
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2.4. We assume that k = 1 and  = 1
2
. In other words, this 1-korsako has
preferences for anticipations, while at the same time discounting the future.
The utility maximizing plan at Day 1 is given in the rst row of Table 2.1.
The next row gives the best consumption plan at Day 2, given that our 1-
korsako ate as much cake as planned the rst day. Likewise row 3, given that
she consumed on Day 1 and Day 2 in accordance with the best intertemporal
plan at Day 1 and Day 2 respectively.
Table 2.1 Consumption plans for 1-korsako eating a cake over a four day
period. Consumption is given in percent.
Consumption Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
Best plan Day 1 58 32 8 2
Best plan Day 2 58 25 14 3
Best plan Day 3 58 25 11 6
Now the best plan at Day 1 prescribes higher consumption on Day 2 than
actually is chosen on Day 2, and likewise for Day 2 and Day 3. Table 2.2 gives
the corresponding utility levels for each time period. Some of the utility of 13.3
on the rst day is anticipation utility (5.7). The following day, consumption is
not 32 but 25. The anticipation utility associated with consumption of 25 the
following day is 5.0. In other words, our Day 1 1-korsako enjoys an excess
utility of 5:7   5:0 = 0:7 due to the dierence between actual and planned
consumption in time period 2.
Table 2.2 Utility associated with consumption and consumption plans for a
1-korsako intending to eat cake over a four day period. The long-run utility is
the sum of the time period utility levels. (xxxusikker p om denne formuleringen
12
holder.
Consumption Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Long-run utility
Best plan Day 1 13:3 8:5 4:3 1:4 27.5
Best plan Day 2 13:3 8:7 7:3 1:9 31.2
Best plan Day 3 13:3 8:7 5:9 2:5 30.4
We see also that long-run utility is up from 27:5 to 31:2. The revision at Day 3,
does not, however, give higher long-run utility, illustrating the potential down-
side of delayed consumption that aects the last day. The Day 4 1-korsako
has no cake-eating future. She cannot enjoy consumption anticipation, and she
cannot, unlike her previous selves, postpone consumption. In other words, she
is at the mercy of the Day 3 1-korsako, who can save, and in this case indeed
does save, more cake to the last day than is optimal from a long-run perspec-
tive. In this numerical example the eect of the second-to-last day revision is
small, but can be considerable for small 's and large k's.
The above example also highlights a general property of these revisions of
consumption plans. Revisions tend to increase long-run utility. Whereas the
long-run utility measure can be challenged, the immediate benet of the revi-
sions cannot. The revisions themselves constitutes Pareto improvements. Sav-
ing more cake than initially planned, leaves more cake for subsequent selves
and increases the utility of the present self.
3 One indivisible good and degrees of sophistication
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider agent types diering with respect to
sophistication. Self-deception in their model occurs because naive agents fail
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to fully take into account the preferences and actions of their future selves. So-
phisticated agents, on the other hand, do. In short, self-deception is attributed
to a kind of limited cognitive ability. In the following discussion we shall adopt
this notion of self-deception and draw heavily on the framework developed in
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
We start with a motivating example:
Example 3.1 A 1-korsako going to Rio.
Sheila has won a trip to Rio and can choose either to go this year, next year
or the year after. We assume her preferences are given by a DU1-model with
anticipation that is DU1 =
P
i 
i 1u(ci;plan; a(ci+1;plan)). We also assume for
simplicity's sake u = ci + a(ci+1;plan). At the beginning of year 1, she faces
three possible consumption plans with the corresponding utilities:
DU1(c; 0; 0) = c
DU1(0; c; 0) = a(c) + c
DU1(0; 0; c) = a(c) + 
2c;
If c > a(c) + c, going the rst year is the preferred alternative. If not, that
is, if c < a(c) + c, postponing the Rio trip to the second year is the better
alternative. Since  < 1, going in the second year is always better than waiting
to the third year. Moreover, if c < a(c)+c, and she does not go the rst year,
she may postpone yet again, and go the third and last year. She may do this
even if going the rst year is strictly better (c > a(c) + 2c) than going the
third year.
This example spurs the following questions. What if Sheila performs the above
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computation? Why compare the rst year and second year alternatives, if she
already knows she will not be going the second year? To address these question
we introduce two types of agent, nafs and sophisticates.
The denitions of nafs and sophisticates are given in terms of strategies. A
strategy is an assignment of an action for every contingency. In the case of
consumption of one indivisible good, this is either consume (Y) or not consume
(N).
Denition 3.1 A perception-perfect strategy for nafs at time i is a strategy,
sn = (sn1 ; s
n
2 ; : : : ; s
n
T ) that satises s
n
i = Y if DUk(i; i) = max(DUk(i; j)) for all
j  i, where DUk(i; j) denotes the utility at time i of consuming the indivisible
good at time j.
Denition 3.2 A perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates is a strategy,
ss = (ss1; s
s
2; : : : ; s
s
T ) that satises for all i < T : s
s
i = Y if and only if
DUk(i; i)  DUk(i; j) for j > i such that j = mink>ifkjssk = Y g.
Sophisticates only compare the utility of consuming today with later con-
sumption times, for which consumption has been planned if reached. That is,
they ignore irrelevant alternatives. Nafs, on the other hand, make compar-
isons with all later consumption dates whether consumption is likely or not
at those times. Added to this, in a T period setting, the construction of the
game requires that snT = Y . Consumption must occur in the nal period, if
not before. 11
11 These denitions are the same as those in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). However, the implementation
in T-period games diers for our sophisticates. An O'Donoghue-Rabin sophisticate does not discount as
assumed under the Samuelson DU model. She is present-biased in the sense of only dierentiating between
now or later, but not between two later periods. Later is just later. In this analysis we use the standard dis-
counting inferred by the DU model, and in this case (see Theorem 3.2), is a sophisticate time-consistent. In
other words, a perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates has more bite in the case of standard discounting.
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In Example 3.1, if Sheila is a naf, she will choose to postpone travelling until
the third year if c < a(c) + c. What she fails to realize, though, is that while
year two is better for Year-1 Sheila, it is not the best for Year-2 Sheila. Year-2
Sheila will transfer the sandy beaches of Rio to Year-3 Sheila. But if Sheila
were a sophisticate, she would know that Year-2 Sheila won't be going to Rio.
So she will only compare going the rst year against going the third year. If
c > a(c) + 2c, she will go the rst year. The results of this example are
special cases of the two following theorems.
Theorem 3.1 Let C be one indivisible good that is to be consumed in one of
the T time periods. Consider a 1-korsako agent with utility function DU1 =PT
i 
i 1u(ci; a(ci+1;plan)). If she is a naf, she will be time-consistent if and only
if u(C; 0)  u(0; a(C)) + u(C; 0).
Theorem 3.2 Let C be one indivisible good that is to be consumed in one of
the T time periods. Consider a 1-korsako agent with utility function DU1 =PT
i 
i 1u(ci; a(ci+1;plan)). If she is a sophisticate, she will be time-consistent.
In sum, these theorems tell us that although sophisticates may have time-
inconsistent preferences, they make time-consistent plans when they take into
account the preferences of their future selves. The case of a 1-korsako naf
and one indivisible good allows for an interesting contingency. She can be
oblivious to potential future revisions and still be time-consistent. This case
relies on a weak preference for anticipations compared to the discount rate. On
the other hand, if anticipations are not outweighed by the discount rate, nafs
may harvest higher long-run utility from repeated delays of consumption. The
following theorem states this formally.
Theorem 3.3 Let C be one indivisible good that is to be consumed in one of
the T time periods. Consider a 1-korsako agent with utility function DU1 =PT
i 
i 1u(ci; ai(ci+1;plan). Let a = u(0; a(C)) and c = u(C; 0). If she is a naf,
her long-run utility will be:
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i. Ulong-run = c if a < (1  )c.
ii. Ulong-run = c+ (T   1)a if a > (1  )c.
Sophisticates, though, given their sophistication, are prevented from having
repeated anticipations of next period consumption:
Theorem 3.4 Let C be one indivisible good, that is to be consumed in one of
the T time periods. Consider a 1-korsako agent with utility function DU1 =PT
i 
i 1u(ci; ai(ci+1;plan)). Let a = u(0; a(C)) and c = u(C; 0). If she is a
sophisticate, her long-run utility will be
i. Ulong-run = c if T is odd.
ii. Ulong-run = a+ c if a > (1  )c and T is even.
According to condition a > (1  )c, the utility of anticipation outweighs the
discounted utility of next period consumption. If it doesn't, consuming in the
rst period gives the highest utility. The even and odd condition is driven by
the backward induction which follows from a perception-perfect strategy for
sophisticates. 12
Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 are, in sum, a bit discouraging. The 1-korsako nafs
can revise consumption plans and enjoy benign self-deception. They never
realize their next period self will make the same calculations as they are doing
today. Sophisticates are prevented from utility increasing revisions. At a more
technical level, a sophisticate's perception-perfect strategy relies on backward
induction, and this prevents unforeseen revisions. In the next section we will
briey discuss an extension to the model that facilitates repeated revision and
12 This dependence of the parity of time periods is also present in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), in the
case of time-consistent agents, TCs. However, in their Example 1 p. 109, they consider only the case of an
even number of time periods (T = 4).
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benign self-deception also for sophisticates.
4 The life span uncertainty model
In the previous section sophisticates obtained lower long-run utility than nafs.
In this section we consider an extension that facilitates repeated revisions by
sophisticates as well as nafs. The following scenario illustrates the extension.
Upon retirement we decide to spend a year in Rio. Knowing we will not live
forever, we need to decide when to go, now or later. As each year passes and
we observe our health (hi), we know that the probability of enjoying good
health throughout the next year (pi) is increasing in hi. Agents do not know
pi, but form subjective beliefs q(hi) of the probability of a healthy year ahead.
For notational convenience we dene p0 = 1.
We formalize this with the following denition.
Denition 4.1 (Life Span Uncertainty Game (LSU game)) An LSU game
is a one player game. At every node, the player has to choose between two
actions, Y or N (consume or not consume an indivisible good). At any given
node i, there is a positive probability (1   pi) that this node is the last. The
probability of continuation pi = p(hi) is an increasing function in hi. The
player observes hi, and assigns a subjective probability q(hi) for a next time
period. The player knows that the true probability pi is a function of hi and
that hi is decreasing over time.
Denition 4.2 (naf in LSU game) A perception-perfect decision rule for
nafs in the LSU game is a rule that assign sni = Y if and only if the ex-
pected utility EDUk(i; i) = max(EDUk(i; j)) for j > i, where EDUk(i; j) =
q(hj)DUk(i; j) and q(hj) is the subjective probability for reaching j given hj.
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In discussing the LSU game we assume that both 1-korsako nafs and sophis-
ticates are risk neutral and maximize expected utility given their observation
of the health parameter hi and subjective probabilities q(hi) for the next time
periods. 13
A perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates in this case, requires a rene-
ment of Denition 3.2. A renement may be achieved in the following way:
Let a = u(0; a(C)) and c = u(C; 0). If a+q(hi)c > c, then it is better to go the
next year. The sophisticate realizes how this reasoning is conditional on going
the next year. Moreover, if a+ q(hi+1)c > c the next-year sophisticate will not
go. In this model there is a critical health level hc such that a + q(hc)c = c.
When hc is reached, there is no point in postponing consumption. In other
words, if the sophisticate believes that hi+1  hc, she may enjoy anticipation
at year i. As hi is decreasing, an hi close to hc may be read as a high probability
of hi+1  hc. We formalize this into the following termination criterion:
Denition 4.3 (-criterion)
If the player observes that hi   hc <  , then q(hi+1 < hc) = 1, else q(hi+1 <
hc) = 0.
We can use this termination criterion to formulate perception-perfect strate-
gies for 1-korsako sophisticates in the LSU game.
Denition 4.4 (-sophisticate in a LSU game)
A perception-perfect decision rule for an -sophisticate in an LSU game is a
rule that assigns
1. (ssi ; s
s
i+1) = (N; Y ) if q(hi)(a+ c) > c and hi   hc <  (q(hi+1 < hc) = 1 by
the -criterion).
13 We do not assume that agents assign lower q's for more distant time periods.
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2. (ssi ; s
s
i+1) = (Y; Y ) if q(hi)(a + c)  c or hi   hc   (q(hi+1 < hc) = 0 by
the -criterion).
for every t.
Theorem 4.1 1-korsako nafs and 1-korsako -sophisticates have the same
expected long-run utility in the LSU game provided hi   hc <  for all i. The
expected long-run utility is in this case: E(U) = a
P1
i=1(
i 1
j=0pj)qi.
The theorem tells us that the LSU game allows sophisticates as well as for
nafs to perform utility increasing revisions. That being the case, they would
both also achieve the same long-run utility. The conditions for this to happen
are restrictive. The health parameter needs to remain low but high enough,
all the same, to exceed hc for all time periods. Sophisticates as well as nafs
end up consuming nothing. Their long-run utility is pure anticipation.
The model can be extended by giving the agent a choice prior to period 1 be-
tween knowing and not knowing the number of time periods. As Epstein(2008)
points out, the agent may well display information aversion. This as adds to
the conict of interest between present you and future you, since knowing the
number of time periods may give the present you higher expected utility , but
at the cost of future you. A thorough discussion of this extended model is
beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusion
We have set out in this paper a framework for benecial self-deception. We
show that utility from anticipation allows the agent to revise plans with imme-
diate and long-runl utility benets. This adds to the downside of commitment
and self-control, and as such stands in contrast with much of the recent liter-
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ature on time inconsistencies and self-deception.
Basically, the paper explores an extension to Samuelson's discounted utility
model that allows agents to remember their plans and value future anticipa-
tion. These agents, called 1-korsakos, are very dierent from those inferred
by Samuelson's standard discounted utility model (0-korsakos). 1-korsakos
may achieve higher immediate and long-run utility from repeated revisions of
consumption plans.
If we assume that agents vary with respect to sophistication, our results are
structurally similar to those of O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). A naf fails
to realize that her future self may decide to deviate from her original plan.
Repeated revisions provide an opportunity for higher long-run utility. A so-
phisticate, on the other hand, doesn't have as many opportunities to engage
in repeated revisions, because she considers only the consumption plans she
is likely to follow. At a technical level, backward induction in consumption
scenarios with a xed number of time periods prevents a sophisticate from
anticipating higher consumption levels of future selves than actually occur.
In sum, the results presented here illustrate the diculties of uniting sophisti-
cation and self-deception even in the pursuit of higher immediate and long-run
utility. This somewhat discouraging insight may be sweetened by a conjecture.
Benign self-deception may be viable for sophisticates in consumption scenarios
with a higher degree of complexity and uncertainty than the stylized consump-
tion scenarios considered here. The nal model extension where uncertainty
regarding the number of time periods facilitates repeated revisions also for so-
phisticated agents can be read as modest evidence in favor of this conjecture.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.1
It is enough to prove the result for T = 3. Consider two consumption plans:
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cplan = (0; 1; 0) and c

plan = (0; 1   ; 0). Since u, and ai are all strictly in-
creasing in their arguments is DU1(0; 1; 0) > DU1(0; 1   ; 0), where we by
slight abuse of notation let DU1(0; 1; 0) denote the total discounted utility
at time 1 associated with the consumption plan (0; 1; 0), and likewise for the
consumption plan (0; 1   ; 0). Furthermore, cplan is also preferred at time
2: DU1(1; 0) > DU1(1   ; 0). Again, since all functions are continuous, in-
creasing and unbounded in their arguments, there exists an 2 such that
DU1(1; 0) = DU1(1  ; 2). (That is, there exists a planned consumption level
at time 3 that fully compensates reduced consumption at time 2, evaluated at
time 2.) By the same line of reasoning, an 3 exists such that DU1(0; 1; 0) =
DU1(0; 1  ; 3). (That is, there exists a planned consumption level at time 3
that fully compensates reduced consumption at time 1, evaluated at time 1.)
Assume that 3 > 2 and consider an 4 2< 2; 3 >. Since u and ai are all
strictly increasing in their arguments, we get: DU1(1; 0) < DU1(1  ; 4) and
DU1(0; 1; 0) > DU1(0; 1  ; 4). In other words, the consumption plan (0; 1; 0)
is strictly preferred to (0; 1   ; 4) at time 1, whereas the latter is strictly
preferred to the former at time 2. It remains to prove whether 3 > 2. This
is equivalent to proving that DU1(0; 1; 0) > DU1(0; 1  ; 2), but this follows
from a direct comparison of the following two equalities:
I: DU1(0; 1; 0) = u(0; 1) + DU1(1; 0)
II: DU1(0; 1  ; 2) = u(0; 1  ) + DU1(1  ; 2)
Since DU1(1; 0) is equal by construction to DU1(1  ; 2) by construction, by
taking the dierence between these two equations we get
DU1(0; 1; 0) DU1(0; 1  ; 2) = u(0; 1)  u(0; 1  ) > 0
The right hand side is greater than zero, thus DU1(0; 1; 0) > DU1(0; 1  ; 2),
which is the desired inequality.
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2Proof of Theorem 3.1
A perception-perfect strategy for nafs at time i is a strategy, sn = (sn1 ; s
n
2 ; : : : ; s
n
T )
that satises sni = Y if DU1(i; i) = max(DU1(i; j)) for j  i That is, she will
delay consumption if and only if there exists a j, j > i that gives higher
utility. Since she is a 1-korsako, and the instantaneous utility function is
equal for all periods, at any given time i, the present utility of time periods
i+ 2; : : : T is strictly less than DU1(i; i) (Note that  < 1 implies DU1(i; j) <
maxfDU1(i; i); DU1(i; i + 1)g for j  i + 2.) In other words, consumption at
time i, sni = Y , if and only if DU1(i; i) = u(C; 0)  u(0; a(C)) + u(C; 0).
Proof of Theorem 3.2
A perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates is one in which ss = (ss1; s
s
2; : : : ; s
s
T )
that satises for all i < T : ssi = Y if and only if DU1(i; i)  DU1(i; j) for
j > i such that j = mink>i(kjssk = Y ). That is, she will only choose action
Y if the present utility of Y gives a higher utility than the present utility of
the next (planned) Y . Since she is a 1-korsako, and the instantaneous utility
function is equal across all periods, at any given time i, the present utility of
time periods i+2; : : : T is strictly less than DU1(i; i) (Note that  < 1 implies
DU1(i; j) < maxfDU1(i; i); DU1(i; i+ 1)g for j  i+ 2.) In other words, con-
sumption at time i, sni = Y , if and only if one of the two following conditions
holds:
1. DU1(i; i) = u(C; 0)  u(0; a(C)) + u(C; 0) and sni+1 = Y
2. sni+1 = N .
As the action at time i is uniquely determined by the time invariant condition
u(C; 0)  u(0; a(C)) + u(C; 0) and the action at time i + 1, the one unique
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perception-perfect strategy will be determined by backward induction. In other
words, she will be time-consistent.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.3
In the rst time period she compares c versus a + c. If a + c  c, sn1 = Y ,
(since all later consumption times will be discounted (c > i(a + c) for all
i > 0). sn = (sn1 ; s
n
2 ; : : : ; s
n
T )=(Y; Y : : : ; Y ). This gives a long-run utility of c.
If a + c > c, then sn1 = N , since consuming the next period is better. Then
sn = (sn1 ; s
n
2 ; : : : ; s
n
T ) = (N; Y; Y : : : ; Y ) denes a perception-perfect strategy.
The same reasoning also applies to a naf who has reached time period i.
That is, sni = (s
n
i ; s
n
2 ; : : : ; s
n
T ) = (N; Y; Y; : : : ; Y ) denes a perception-perfect
strategy at time i. The long-run utility is c + (T   1)a, since in every time
period consumption in the next period gives the highest utility except when
the nal period T is reached.
2
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Using backward induction we get ssT 1 = Y if and only if c  a+c. That is a 
(1  )c. In this case (by induction again) ss = (ss1; ss2; : : : ; ssT ) = (Y; Y; : : : ; Y )
is a perception-perfect strategy. This gives long-run utility c. If a < (1   )c
then ssT 1 = N . In this case s
s
T 2 must be equal to Y , since c > a+
2c (Note:
a < (1   )c implies a + 2 < (1   )c + 2c = c < c (only next period
anticipation for 1-korsakos, and ssT 1 = N implies no planned consumption
in time period (T   1)). By induction we get that ss = (ss1; ss2; : : : ; ssT ) =
(Y;N; Y; : : : ; N; Y ) if T is odd, and ss = (ss1; s
s
2; : : : ; s
s
T ) = (N; Y;N; : : : ; N; Y )
if N is even. By construction these strategies are perception-perfect strategies
for the odd and even cases respectively. The long-run utility associated with
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these strategies is c if T odd, and a+ c if T even.
2
Proof of Theorem 4.1
If hi   hc <  for all i, the perception-perfect decision rule for -sophisticates
and nafs agrees at every achieved decision node (time interval). Furthermore,
their beliefs regarding future behavior are the same in that both believe in next
period consumption. The long-run utility is given by q1a+ p1q2a+ p2p1q3a+
   = aP1i=1(i 1j=0pj)qi.
2
Example A.1
Going to Rio, the case of a 3-korsako
Sheila has won a trip to Rio. She has three options. Go this year, next year
or the year after. We assume for expository purposes that her preferences
are given by an additive DU3-model with memory and anticipation, Ui =
ci+mi(c<i) + ai(c>i; plan), with a slight notational abuse measuring all three
in utility directly.
Sheila has three possible consumption plans (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0), and (0; 0; 1). 14
Their corresponding utility evaluated at the start of year one is:
U(1; 0; 0) = 1 + m1 + 2m2
U(0; 1; 0) = a1 +  + 2m1
U(0; 0; 1) = a2 + a1 + 2;
14 The consumption utility of the Rio trip is normalized to 1
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where m1 = m2(c<2) = m2((1; 0; 0)), the superscript tells us that it is refer-
ring to memories of consumption in the previous period and m2 = m3(c<3) =
m3((1; 0; 0)), the superscript tells us that it is memories of consumption two
periods back. We adopt the same notation for anticipation; that is, a1 is an-
ticipation of next period anticipation, and a2 anticipation of consumption two
periods later.
If she does not travel the rst year, she will compare, a1 +  to 1 + m1 the
second year. Assume that a1+ > 1+m1, then she will rate traveling the sec-
ond year as better than the rst year, provided that m1 > m2, i.e. she values
rst order memories higher than second order. She will be time-inconsistent
if a1 +  + 2m1 > a2 + a1 + 2. In other words, she is time-inconsistent if
a1 > max(1 +m1; (a2 +(1 2)m1)=(1 )) and m1 > m2. In this case,
time inconsistency relies on her rating next period consumption higher than
combination of next period memories and later periods anticipation. The ques-
tion of time inconsistency under full recollection is shown to be nontrivial by
this example, and dependent on the relative strength of utility of anticipation
and memories as well as the discount factor.
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